The major contributi on of Max Weber, according to the author, is to be seen in the concept of the "modern world" and its desti ny as a society based on rati onal calculati on. Such modern rati onality is technically equipped and formal from a logical point of view. It provides a link between desired social goals and available resources to reach them. It is also a challenge for the decision-making power groups, unable to face the consequences of such rati onality that begins as a liberati on from traditi onal values and ends up in some sort of "steel cage". Weber does not seem capable of suggesti ng a way out of this social and politi cal contradicti on.
At the basis of the lasti ng, even growing, fascinati on of Max Weber as man and thinker there are probably two reasons. First, there is an essenti al reason: Weber tackles a central theme, sti ll today at the heart of our concerns, and to which he returns in all his works, more or less directly -the nature, directi on, and future of the "modern world." Second, there is the questi on of the method in the broad sense of the word, including the theoreti cal-conceptual apparatus and specifi c research techniques, or an especially immediate démarche.
What is, for Weber, the "modern world"?
It is a world ruled and defi ned by "rati onal calculati on." In Weber's perspecti ve, the modern world is that of total calculability. The constructi on of this modern world as one rati onally calculated or calculable passes through two basic phases: (a) "disenchantment" (Entzauberung der Welt), and (b) the laicizati on and routi nizati on of the "profession" (Beruf), which becomes mundane as a specifi c bureaucrati c methodical competence, instead of a "calling" or religious vocati on.
It seems hardly necessary to note that this two-layered process of social transformati on takes place and develops in the framework of a sti ll more radical passage -a real
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historical leap -wherein we have a transiti on from a magicoreligious traditi onalism, a vision of one's desti ny which is essenti ally transcendent, of which we might say with Goethe that `Alles Vergängliche / ist nur ein Gleichnis." We move on to a society characterized by a process of increasingly large-scale industrializati on, with the openly declared intenti on of producing its own values, and which furthermore does not acknowledge the binding force of any criterion of evaluati on outside the internal correctness of its own proceedings. Once transcendence has collapsed, or, more exactly, once transcendent principles have been translated and reduced to methodical daily habits (at the basis of which Weber someti mes seems to perceive sti ll the refl ecti on of ancient religious values no longer consciously grasped or accepted as such), Weber's modern world seems to be in a Nietzschean sense "human, all too human."
The contrast with types of preceding societi es -traditi onal paleotechnical, preindustrial -all linked to a marked, all pervasive, magicoreligious symbolism, is so strong as to be presented as a qualitati ve break. As Huizinga, for example, comments, the spirit of that ti me was so full of Christ that the slimmest analogy with the Lord's life or passion which any act or thought might have, would instantly summon up his image. A poor nun bringing fi rewood into the kitchen saw herself as bearing the cross. The simple idea of bearing wood was enough to surround the acti on with the aura of a supreme act of love. A blind washerwoman takes the washtub and washboard for the crib and stable.
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From the Magico-Religious to the Individualized Rational
In the modern world, there is no longer room for this magicoreligious, essenti ally otherworldly symbolism. In Weber's view, at the most it lies in a residual space, necessarily desti ned to disappear. The "sense," the meaning, of the modern, rati onal, individualized world can develop only in reverse proporti ons to the gradual withdrawal, the so-to-speak contracti on of the magicoreligious sphere. Indeed, as Weber says in Economy and Society, the more intellectualism rejects belief in magic, and thus the processes of the world become "disenchanted" [und so die Vorgänge der Welt "entzaubert" werden], they lose their magical meaning: they are restricted to "being" and "appearing" [geschehen] , instead of "meaning" [bedeuten] , so the need increases for the world, the "conduct of life" [Lebensführung] , insofar as they make up a whole, to be meaningfully set out and "provided with meaning" [sinnvoll] .
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In his usual meti culous manner, Weber analyzes the "paths" whereby "intellectualism" -fi rst of all responsible for "disenchantment" -gradually becomes a current shared idea instead of a characteristi c of narrow intellectual circles. It is the typical atti tude of a whole social form and existenti al inclinati on, or an empirically testable character proclivity, of a total historical phase. In Weber's view, the resulti ng collapse of "magicoreligious meaning" increases and indeed makes essenti al the responsible adopti on of "life conduct' in itself "meaningful" (sinnvoll), endowed with meaning no longer as ti ed to transcendent symbolic meanings and collecti ve-communitarian validity, but rather as they emphasize the moral and intellectual responsibility of the individual -only now, at last, faced with his knowledge and his god. Weber, therefore, not only makes clear the results, but primarily the premises and cultural bases, of the process of industrializati on as a universal social one which defi nes the modern world. He also stresses the eliti st and typically intellectual nature of those bases, right from their evoluti onary-geneti c beginning. 5 However, one should not thereby believe in a Weber indulgent toward a formulati on of the descripti on and interpretati on -if not the explanati on -of social phenomena in a monocausal sense. Nor, on the basis of the undeniable implicati on in certain passages taken out of context, should one support a basically "evoluti onisti c" Weber, as latt erly Talcott Parsons has done. This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of Weber's positi on -which, however, from his point of view, had the advantage of making Weber a kind of forerunner of "social acti on," as was to be developed by the author of The Social System in collaborati on with sociologists and social analysts running from Robert Bales to Edward A. Shils, George C. Homans, and Neil Smelser.
In Weber, the analysis of the process of rati onalizati on (which lies at the basis of the coming of the modern world and, in essence, defi nes it and makes it up) makes no concession to the theory of the "great evoluti onary universals" which in Parsons's view can be identi fi ed in the growth of all human societi es. In the same way, he is very careful regarding the ever-possible confusion between analyti cal concepts -needful for research as mental constructs for meaningfully reordering the immense mass of empirical data -and concrete historical situati ons, nonreducible in their specifi city. Far from the oft en empty generalizati on which characterizes Parsons' method, with its curious identi fi cati on of social theory with the simple constructi on of basically arbitrary, excessively generalized, abstract models -to the point of tumbling into theoreti cal vagueness and the generic -Weber is concerned with identi fying what is unique in the historical experience of the West. He strongly criti cizes the evoluti onary, holisti c tendencies both in their cumulati ve and mechanisti c form (Spencer) and their historical dialecti cal one (Marx).
It is easy, especially regarding "disenchantment" and "rati onalizati on," to adopt a misleading view of Weber's thought. Weber can be reproved for a limitati on, or for a certain Nietzschean taste for the aphorism, the fragmentary, but in reality this is his great asset. I do not think it correct to regard this as solely the refl ecti on of his logical philosophical positi on as a neo-Kanti an, which excludes any generalizati on on the ulti mate nature of the social phenomena dealt with, just as it would be hard to fi nd in Weber the equivalent of a supraindividual reality comparable to Durkheim's representati ons collecti ves. Rather, it should be remembered that Weber always clearly disti nguishes between and keeps separate the analyti cal level and specifi c historic content. In his analysis of social phenomena, Weber is a rigorous individualist, applying and achieving a strictly individualist methodological approach, althoughfar from failing into a psychologisti c positi on or one, as has been suggested, close to "symbolic interacti onism" he is solely concerned with large insti tuti onal complexes with a basically structuralist outlook.
We shall see later, when we look more directly at the form of Weber's method, what is implied by the contradicti on we have indicated. What should be stressed here is that the concept of rati onality, which for Weber underlies the process of rati onalizati on is in no way schemati c or intrinsically necessary. It is not necessarily progressive or cumulati ve in a unilinear sense. Indeed, it contains a multi plicity of meanings and thus is presented basically as a problemati c concept.
Sociological analysis has oft en gone forward by way of a schemati c counterposing of historically diff erent situati ons and phases, nicely summarized in an umbrella concept such as: community versus society, nature versus culture, economy versus ideology, structure versus personality, traditi on versus rati onality, military versus industrial society, and so on. As regards these rather mechanical, historically ingenuous dualisms, Weber's positi on appears much more problemati c and complex, and in any case far removed from black-and-white interpretati ons. One can even say that he was strongly att racted by the contradictory aspects and anti nomies of rati onality.
In this regard, Reinhard Bendix has cited two well-known, convincing examples. As against the widespread noti on that Weber's thought describes a unilinear and necessarily progressive development from a magicoreligious epoch to an historical, rati onalist-scienti fi c phase, or from a patrimonial type of economic undertaking -or one of robbery -to one based on rati onal calculati on (writt en, ongoing accountability, with scienti fi c planning of available resources as regards profi t), one should remember his analysis of ancient Judaism and Calvin's teaching in the context of the Protestant ethic. 6 In the fi rst case we have a decline of the magicoreligious sphere because of the rise of prophecy. However, as Weber accurately notes, aft er the Babylonian capti vity, the dynamic power of the prophets yields and gives way to ritualized faithfulness to the law under the tutelage of the rabbis. Thus here increasing rati onality fi rst determines, or accompanies, the broad values of a monotheist religion, only later to debauch into the irra ti onality of formalized rituals and the loss of interior meaning regarding commandments initi ally rich with symbolic signifi cance. As Weber observed, the propheti c horizon remained wholly terrestrial, like the offi cial Babylonian one, as against the Greek mysteries and the Orphean religion. Jewish prophecy, though linked to the Levites' care of the soul, was concerned only with the desti ny of the people as a whole. Thereby it repeatedly demonstrated its politi cal orientati on. The increasing bourgeois rati onalism of a people integrated into the relati vely pacifi ed world of the Persian empire, and aft erwards that of Hellenism, made the suppression of prophecy possible for the priests. As for Calvinism, the analyti c precision with which Weber makes clear the paradox of the teaching is well known. This referred to the total inscrutability of divine will as well as to the certainty of salvati on. At the same ti me, as regards the practi cal business of life, or lived morality, it draws conclusions about methodical living, industry, the sancti fi cati on of life, sobriety and saving, and thus about accumulati on and the subsequent reinvestment of capital. One starts with uncertainty regarding one's own ultraterrestrial salvati on and ends up with the foundati on of the major Swiss banks. This same brilliant nature of Weber's work has itself created an opportunity for crude misunderstanding. Even a cursory reconstructi on of the cultural climate prevailing at the ti me Weber's text saw the light -at the beginning of the century -may be suffi cient to let us understand both its success and these defi ciencies in understanding. A major success is almost always a great danger. Weber provided the example for an unusual heterogenesis of aims, in order to show the complex, multi dimensional character, the basic reciprocity, of the relati on between structure and culture. However, Weber's meti culous analyti cal precision has not been given full credit. Bendix himself, as Eisenstadt has shown, did not explore his subject profoundly enough, being content with a cursory presentati on. 8 For Weber, there was no questi on of overthrowing Marx's argument -or more precisely, that of the Marxism of his day, mostly undialecti cal and as yet unaware of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as well as of the Grundrisse -but to expose the complex interacti on which cannot a priori be established by a wholly theoreti c deducti ve calculati on. It thus requires a specifi c historical research of the bi-directi onal relati on between the structure of "material" and "ideal" interests.
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The Idea of Interest
We are not thus faced with a counterpositi on between "material interests" and "ideas" but rather between two diff erent types of interest. However, the central category is always that of interest -also what is involved in the sphere of knowledge which is not directly applicable or useful. This must be borne in mind as it helps to explain some important aspects of Weber's Positi on: (1) His rejecti on of vulgar anti -Marxism and his explicit recogniti on of Marxism as one working hypothesis or "ideal-type" model, albeit among others. (2) The rejecti on of an all-inclusive conceptual system, tendenti ally dogmati cally closed, in favor of the "open system" linked to the value choices of the individual. This gives rise to the characteristi c "moderate relati vism" (moderated by the major values of the European liberal traditi on which, as we can boldly say today, Weber sees as eternally conquered and so beyond questi on). (3) The typically Weberian tendency not to be limited to a literally correct reading of the theoreti cal texts and the ethic of Protestanti sm and other religions, but rather to be concerned with a lived ethic -that is, with ethical precepts as they are manifested in everyday existence through the practi cal behavior of determinate individuals and social groups. (4) Finally, the profound argument dealing with universal religions, immediately relevant to our discussion in that it rests on a dual purpose First, it att empts to establish comparati vely in terms of the uniqueness of the historical experience of Western Europe ("Nur im Okzident . .") contrasted with the failure to develop capitalism in other parts of the world, governed by other ethical or religious systems, or other magicoreligious models. To these last, Weber does not att ribute a necessarily causal responsibility in the literal sense for the failure of capitalist development of the West European kind, but he sees them as meaningful accomplishments. Second, it tries to determine the process of the beginning of rati onalizati on which was to peak and be diff used through the triumph of rati onality as a principle of social organizati on and a new source of the legiti mati on of power by means of a series of intermediate stages which run from "disenchantment of the world" to the camoufl age of religious values under fake lay dress. This is Thomas Luckmann's "invisible religion". At the other extreme these arrive at the scienti fi cally, rati onally determined work of formal bureaucrati c orders and ulti mately at the dubious victory of a white-collar world peopled by hard-working, malleable men.
What strikes one in Weber's broad analysis is the precision with which he grasps and brings out the traditi onal elements in the innovati ve, rati onalizing processes and at the same ti me the factors of change in a rati onal directi on already present in the structure of traditi ons. (Some imperfecti ons of form are certainly to be att ributed to its posthumous appearance and to the fact that it was edited by J. Winckelmann, with great fi delity to the originals.) In this perspecti ve, it would be hard to see in Weber a kind of precursor or disti nguished forerunner of the schemati c theories of "secularizati on," and sti ll less of the current well-known argument concerning a supposed "eclipse of the sacred." The somewhat extemporary nature of these and similar theories is clear in the connecti on -so much taken for granted as not to require empirical testi ng -between urbanizati on and industrializati on and sti ll more between in dustrializati on and the scienti fi c atti tude, based on the cause-eff ect sequence. However, the survival in advanced industrial societi es of many animisti c, and someti mes crudely anthropomorphic, beliefs shows that acceptance of a cultural model based on rigorous rati onality in a scienti fi c sense is sti ll sporadic and in any event liable to major excepti ons.
Rationality as a Problematic Concept
One can further plausibly argue that the examples quoted by Weber in support of his case (especially as material proving the Protestant ethic to be a factor of economic development and the "spirit of capitalism" as a way of life are not wholly credible. That Benjamin Franklin represents clearly a typifi cati on of the Protestant ethic in practi ce is somewhat dubious; likewise, or even more so, is the example of Fugger, cited by Werner Sombart, the disti nguished criti c and opponent of Weber. At any rate, it is not a questi on of this: or rather, it is not a questi on of accuracy or adequacy in the literal sense of the words, but rather of Weber's general concepti on regarding the nature of the modern world. In Weber's terms, this nature can be traced to the specifi c forms of the process of rati onalizati on, as taken on from ti me to ti me in the diff erent fi elds of the -analyti cally discernable -social. This process is seen in terms of a general concept of a rati onality never completely or defi niti vely stated, which varies and is transformed in the diff erent sectors of social life, from the religious to the economic, politi cal, juridical, and organizati onal -bureaucrati c.
Weberian rati onality is thus essenti ally problemati c. As for that Eurocentrism which, for Weber as for the scholars of his generati on is unconsciously taken as an initi al premise, one might say that rati onality is a unique characteristi c of Western European history; at the same ti me, it is a normati ve term, an historic task to be performed, a real Grenzbegriff an idea-limit. As such it is positi ve; but at the very moment it seems to be historically achieved, and at the point of becoming dominant it reverses itself and takes on a negati ve connotati on in the context of a totally administered society and a tendenti ally totalizing bureaucrati c formal organizati on which cheats the individual out of his rati onality in order to set him in the name of effi ciency in a "steel cage."
Weber's rati onality fl uctuates therefore between radical anti nomies. It seems to be att ached to the individual, his decisions and acti ons. In this context it is not, cannot be, intersubjecti ve. The romanti c pathos of this does indeed have its roots in the oft -stated awareness which makes the individual -it is for him alone, in his solitude -to decide and act according to his "feeling." "Culture," he says, is an area closed off by the meaningless infi nity of the future of the world, to which directi on and meaning is ascribed from man's point of view. It is such also for men who confl ict with a concrete culture as though with a mortal enemy, and who aspire to a "return to nature." They can arrive at this positi on only in that they refer concrete culture to their ideas on value.
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Yet Weber does not shrink from formulati ons which at ti mes seem to point to a general characteristi c of modem humanity in rati onality, one which certainly has its historical roots in Western Europe, but according to a universalisti c view which makes one remember a scienti sti c element, at ti mes clearly technocrati c in the Veblen of The Place of Science in Modern Civilizati on. 10 There are lesser writers, pointless to menti on here, representati ve of a "middle culture" -for instance, the famous author of The Two Cultures and the Scienti fi c Revoluti on. 11 In Wissenschaft als Beruf, Weber says that from the practi cal point of view, intellectualisti c nati onalizati on directed toward science and scienti fi cally oriented technique does not indicate a general progressive knowledge of the condi ti ons of life surrounding us. Rather, it points to something quite diff erent: the awareness or the belief that everything in principle can be mastered by reason. This in turn means the disen chantment of the world. One no longer needs to resort to magic to master or to ingrati ate oneself with the spirits, as does the savage, for whom like power exists. Reason and technical means provide this. Above all, this is the meaning of intellectualizati on as such.
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The Individual's Social Action
It could be considered that Weber sees the weight of reason in human history as decisive. In reality, this is not so. At least parti ally and also in the West, social acti on escapes from its control. For Weber, social acti on is an individual act which is socialized by anti cipati ng and reacti ng to the acts of other people. As he said, as with any acti on, social acti on may also be determined: (a) in a rati onal way as regards the end -by expectati ons regarding the atti tude of objects of the outside world and other men, making use of these expectati ons as "conditi ons" or "means" for rati onally willed and calculated ends, as follows -(b) in a manner rati onal as regards the value -from the conscious belief in the unconditi onal Parsons' criti cisms on this point manifest a deep misunderstanding (as we have noted above and elsewhere). Weber is not concerned to construct the total, necessarily reifi ed "social system." He is aware that this would mean freezing history and producing an abstract exercise in modeling: this would possibly help to reorder the data concerning the existi ng situati on, but it would not be possible to take social change into account. The "grand visions," the all-inclusive social systems for Weber can only be the product of basically useless intellectual exercises. Anyone, he said with a certain irony, who wants a vision should go to the cinema: on the other hand anyone who longs for sermons should go to a monastery. These aforementi oned comments, which may seem ironic, distant, and tough, are really self-deprecatory, almost reaching the level of pathos. They contain the core, the nature of the concept of "disenchantment". In fact, he said, if the desti ny of an age which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is in know that we cannot grasp the meaning of cosmic development on the basis of the conclusion of the investi gati on, however perfectly established, the consequence is logically inevitable. The responsibility for "meaning," once it has departed from the great traditi ons, or the authority of the "eternal yesterday" as its basic and essenti al foundati on, rests fi nally on the individual's decisions. The "meaning" is no longer given: to Weber, we as individuals must be "capable of creati ng it ourselves."
Because of this basic reason and logical bond, Weber speaks of a "polytheism of values," the "right to the unilateral analysis of reality," and the basic necessity of "presuppositi ons" declared and decided upon by the individual who undertakes the specifi c research, so as to succeed in determining what is important and what is not.
14 Rati onality is thus handed over to the individual and his presuppositi ons; as already noted, appears as a highly anti nomic concepti on, whose meaningful connecti ons are to be found within the general polarity which for Weber is to be found in the tensiondisti ncti on between material and formal rati onality. In most of the areas menti oned above, this tension-disti ncti on parti cularly involves the economic, juridical sector. Weber said that an economic acti on should be formally defi ned as rati onal to the extent that the "economic thrust" essenti al to any rati onal economy can be interpreted, and should be interpreted, in numerical expressions, of "calculati on," wholly cutti ng out the technical formulati on of these calculati ons, and thereby the monetary or natural nature of their esti mati ons. Nonetheless, this concepti on is univocal, at least in the sense that the monetary form represents the highest level of such formal esti mability
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-naturally, all other things being equal. In contrast, the concept of material rati onality takes on very diff erent meanings. It simply expresses this common element -that analysis is not sati sfi ed with the fact, which can be stated in a relati vely unequivocal manner, and that there must be a rati onal calculati on as regards the aim, using the most suitable technical means. However, it gives weight instead to the ethical, politi cal, uti litarian, hedonisti c requirements (Forderungen), those of the stratum of equality, or indeed any other kind. It measures against them, on the basis of rati onality as regards value, or a material goal (Wertrati onal oder material zweckrati onal), the consequences of economic acti on even if this be formally rati onal, calculable. One must, however, observe that it is always possible, in a totally autonomous form as regards this material criti que of the economic eff ect -a criti que which is ethical, aestheti c, and asceti c of the intenti on and methods of economic acti vity (Wirtschaft sgesimmung sowohl wie der Wirtschaft smitt el). The merely formal (bloss formale) functi on of monetary calculati on may appear subordinate or contradictory (subaltern order geradezu... feindlich) with their postulates, when confronted with all these forms of criti cism.
Weber also remarks on natural calculati on, and the natural economy which historically corresponds to this -that is, the economy which neither knows about nor practi ces the use of money. However, as usual, he expresses his own thoughts in analyti cally counterposed conceptual frameworks, returning to rati onal calculati on as capital's calculati on, a full and historically unparalleled expression of formal rati onality. He does this in order to identi fy the connecti ons and conditi ons which actually make it possible. Basically, there are three conditi ons:
(1) Market competi ti on [Marktkampf] between economies which are -at least relati vely autonomous. Prices expressed monetarily are the products of struggle and compromise, and thereby the result of clusters of power
(2) The highest level of economic acti vity, as a means of orienti ng calculati on, is achieved by monetary esti mate in the form of capital's calculati ons: this involves the material presuppositi on of the widest market freedom, in the sense of the absence of monopolies, whether these be imposed from without and economically irrati onal or voluntary and economically rati onal (that is to say, directed on the basis of market possibiliti es).
(3) Not all "demand" [Begehr] in itself, but demand for useful services based on buying power, materially determines -through determinati on of the calculati on by capital -the producti on of goods in the context of an acquisiti ve economy. Thus, for the directi on of producti on, the "constellati on" of marginal uti lity of the social stratum living on unearned income is decisive. This stratum has the power and inclinati on to acquire a specifi c service for purposes of uti lity.
In Weber's outline of these three conditi ons, the extraordinary awareness of the historic nature of concepts and kinds of economic relati on is striking: these, in the traditi on of classical economics, seemed natural concepts and processes, and by defi niti on nonmodifi able and metahistorical. If only in passing, the att enti on Weber pays to money (which is not an innocuous designati on of services of undetermined usefulness, and moreover cannot be arbitrarily altered without fundamentally aff ecti ng the nature of the prices established by the struggle between individuals) introduces a completely politi cal and sociological element into the discussion of this theme; the theme is mostly regarded as ideally "indiff erent" and purely technical and is not confronted yet by modem monetarists. Witness of this is the work of Milton Freidman and the discussions inspired by him.
Weber's analysis is not just limited to the discussion of macroeconomic conditi ons. It follows an examinati on of the moti ves which in a market economy are the "decisive sti mulus for economic acti on." To understand fully the structure of these moti vati onal pressures, as well as to avoid any lapse into the purely psychologisti c level, Weber clearly conceptualizes -almost running the risk of schemati c presentati on -the disti ncti on-tension between market economy and planned economy. In brief, one can say that in his view, while in a market economy the acti vity of parti cular, autonomous forms of the economy is directed also autonomously ... in a planned economy, on the other hand, every economic acti vity is directed, insofar as it is realized, in conformity with the domesti c economy, heteronomously, on the basis of regulati ons which command and prohibit, as well as on the basis of a perspecti ve of rewards and punishments.
In the context of the market economy, the sti mulus to economic acti vity is represented by three moti vati ons:
(1) For the have-nots by the coercive force of the risk of a total lack of supplies for themselves and their dependents (children, wives and ulti mately parents), for whom the individual must typically provide, as well as, in various degrees, by an internal predispositi on to economic work as a form of life. (2) For those who actually enjoy a positi on of privilege, because they have no possessions or educati on (in turn determined by possessions), the sti mulus comes from possibiliti es of high incomes, ambiti on, and the value conferred on prized types of labor (spiritual, arti sti c, technical, etc.). (3) For those who take part in the possibiliti es of acquisiti ve enterprises, the sti mulus comes from the risk of their own capital and their own opportuniti es for gain, in connecti on with the "professional" dispositi on toward rati onal acquisiti on. That is the case insofar as this is seen as a "proof" [Bewahrung] of the service itself, and as a form of autonomous dominati on over the people who depend on instructi ons from them,
and also control over possibiliti es of supplying the wants of an indeterminate mass of individuals; their instructi ons thereby have importance for their culture or their lives -in short, as a form of power.
Formal Rationality, Material Rationality, and Planning
Let us suppose that instead of a market economy there is, and operates, a planned economy. What would its results for structure and psychological-moti vati onal "dispositi on" be? First, Weber notes that there would be a certain lessening of coercion derived from the risk of the lack of supplies. A planned economy would not in fact be able to discharge onto its dependents the results of a potenti ally lesser service from the worker. Equally, the autonomy of enterprises' management would diminish, with a subsequent lessening, probably to zero, of the risk to capital, with the apparently inevitable recourse to "idealisti c sti muli of an altruisti c nature". Yet, at the same ti me, a planned economy would also have to face up to a more-or-lessradical diminuti on of formal rati onality, basically linked with monetary calculati on and that of capital. There thus arises the problem of the practi cal realizati on of socialism, in the sense that formal rati onality b ased on an esti mate regarding capital which allows rati onal accountability, and material rati onality, which obeys ethical needs and those of postuti litarian justi ce, diff er from each other so greatly that there arises an irreconcilable contradicti on which, in turn, refl ects the basis of the "irrati onality of the economy which is one of the roots of any social problemati c, above all that of socialism."
However, it is more in the politi cal sphere than in the economic and juridical ones that those characteristi cs which split up the seemingly unitary nature of modern society become explosive and reach breaking point. They arise as an impassable obstacle. The process of rati onalizati on broadens out here into the formati on of formal bureaucrati c orders, from which there grow contradicti ons, oppositi ons, which in Weber's analysis seem irreconcilable. Of the three pure types of legiti mate power, the bureaucrati c type would at fi rst sight seem the one logically ti ed to rati onality. In fact, Weber convincingly outlines its characteristi cs and presuppositi ons -rati onal and impersonal -as a "cosmos of abstract rules and norms established accordingly," regarding the value, ends, or both, as against the other two types of power, traditi onal and charismati c. One might say that, with the advent of legal, bureaucrati c power in the formal sense, with a rati onal character insofar as it "rests on the belief in the legality of decreed regulati ons, and on the right to command of those called upon to exercise (legal) power on the basis of these," the process of rati onalizati on fi nally triumphs. Meanwhile, complementarily, on the strictly politi cal plane, on the ruins of the ancient social orders dominated by aristocrati c, dynasti c orders, there is proclaimed mass democracy and the modern "social" state; that is, alternati vely, the entrepreneurial, planning, all -administering state. Bureaucrati c structure is more than ever necessary. Legal bureaucrati c power is inconceivable without its administrati ve apparatus. Furthermore, with its characteristi c depersonalizati on of functi ons and, simultaneously, the specializati on of responsibiliti es, bureaucrati c structure seems basically to cling to the egalitarianism of democracy and its intrinsic need for impersonal rotati on and socializati on of power. However, the egalitarianism of the bureaucracy is formal: that which underlies democracy is substanti al, unless one wishes to reduce the concept of democracy to a simple ensemble of formal procedures, independently of socioeconomic content, on the basis of the principle that he who desires democracy must be content with this. (This is the conclusion drawn by most American politologues [Lipset, Dahl, Polsky, etc.] , but also by the Europeans, who follow the same tracks with mini mal variati ons [Lepsius, Crozier, Bobbio, Sartori, etc.].)
In fact, as Weber never ti red of pointi ng out, bureaucracy tends to involve society in its enti rety, and to deprive politi cians of their functi on by routi nizing them and depriving them of authority. The instrument for removing this authority, which foreshadows the atrophy of politi cal judgment, is specialized knowledge. This is at the root of the insti tuti on of specifi c power (one only controls what one knows) and of the social fi gure of the bureaucrat. In fact, the specifi c mode of functi oning of modern bureaucracy, in his view, rests on certain general "principles." First there is the principle of the spheres of competence of defi nite authoriti es, disciplined in a general manner through rules: that is, through administrati ve laws and regulati ons. Second, there is the principle of the hierarchy of offi ces, and the series of procedures -a rigidly regulated system of supra-and subordinati on of the organisms of authority, with control of the superiors over their inferiors. Third, modem offi ce management is based on documents (agreements) which are preserved in the original or in duplicate, and on an apparatus of subaltern and clerical functi onaries of all kinds. Fourth, every offi cial acti vity normally presupposes meti culous specialized preparati on. Fift h, offi cial acti vity claims the whole of the bureaucrat's working capacity. Sixth, the offi ce procedure of the functi onary follows general rules which can be learned. The knowledge of these rules is thus a special technique which functi onaries have 15 .
The Sociopolitical Consequences of Specialized Knowledge
Modern techniques and the economics of the producti on of goods leave specialized knowledge out of considerati on. Man thus cannot escape dominati on by the bureaucracy, since it is precisely that, in a form indissolubly linked to material, or at any rate objecti ve, interests, which ends up by determining individuals' conditi ons of existence. The legal functi onary type therefore seems to leave out the great
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sociohistorical upheavals, as far as Weber is concerned. "Power," "leaders" change, but the "functi on" of bureaucracy, its "specifi c technique" of performing all the duti es of power, remains. It is transformed but cannot be eliminated. The potency that such a specialized knowledge in the bureaucracy involves, in reality increased by the competence acquired on the job (from which there is derived the concept of the "offi cial secret," analogous to the commercial secrets of the fi rm), only the capitalist entrepreneur can oppose.
16
Only the private interest in profi t can, indeed, in the context of its own interest, att ain the specialized knowledge and awareness of things which can free him from the dominance of the rati onal wisdom of bureaucracy, which thereby becomes a tool in his own hands. Elsewhere, bureaucracy, out of the need to be able to choose freely the best qualifi ed functi onaries, creates within itself the conditi ons for bringing about a certain kind of leveling; it tends, too, to create the "power of formalisti c impersonality", which allows it to discharge in a purely technical manner -as regards "anyone" -the objecti ve duti es involved in a parti cular department. As we have seen, there are two basic characteristi cs to Weber's bureaucracy: "permanence" and the functi on of "rati onalizati on." Once in being, bureaucracy becomes the hardest social structure to throw down. Elsewhere, it represents the most suitable means for transforming "community acti on" into "social acti on," rati onally ordered. It is at the same ti me an imposing instrument for "socializati on" in the hands of whoever has control of the bureaucrati c apparatus.
17 Any "mass" resist ance is bound to succumb in face of the characteristi c indispensability of a "conti nuous," "functi oning," "impersonal" apparatus. The bureaucrati c phenomenon, apart from having its own social and economic conditi ons, is also able to generate them; this is especially the case where the distributi on of power and the directi on provided to the apparatus of those who use its powers are involved. 18 The rati onalizing functi on of this structure permits an understanding of the current and potenti al capacity of politi cal and 16 At the beginning, the coming of the charismati c leader may reduce or overthrow the existi ng type of bureaucracy. Later, it turns out that the latt er acquires a new force according to strength of the requirement to observe the duti es the "new law" imposes. 17 One should remember in this context the famous criti cism of the "indefi nite progress of the bureaucrati zing tendency," lately set out convincingly by R. K. Merton. However, we must look elsewhere for the valid aspect of Weber's insight -in having pointed out a common, indeed isomorphic, tendency in capitalism and socialism as rati onal systems. 18 An important fact regarding modem capitalist bureaucracy is its relati ve independence from state bureaucracy. The latt er has characteristi cs in common with military organizati on, as the modem army has a pronounced bureaucrati c character, in contrast with feudal armies, for example. However, it is important that two of the most characteristi cally capitalist societi es (including those of older origin), England arid the United States, are in fact those, of all the great modem powers, in which the army has a slighter infl uence on social structure as compared with the major European states. These facts show that capitalist bureaucracy has an independent development. Cf. T. Parsons, La strutt ura dell'azione sociale (Bologna: II Mulino, 1962), p. 626. industrial capitalism, as against Marx, for whom the system of the capitalist economy is dominated by internal contradicti ons and class confl ict.
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Charisma and Routine
However, the confi nes of the formalism and routi nizati on of bureaucrati c procedures did not escape Weber's noti ce. The concept of "charismati c power" also helps Weber to counterbalance certain consequences of the acti vity of bureaucrati c power. Especially in relati on to events in Germany during and aft er the First World War, Weber concludes by posing the dilemma of bureaucracy -presented as lying between the alternati ves of organizati onal effi ciency and the formalizati on of confl icts, characteristi c of every sociological experiment and observati on of the phenomenon: the problem, in short, of the relati ons between bureaucracy and bureaucrati zati on, or between the development of organizati ons which promote and facilitate the achievement of certain ends. They provide services, fully performing important functi ons, but are in contrast with the phenomenon of an ever-increasing absorpti on of uncontrollable powers from the side of these organizati ons.
20
Weber sees bureaucracy as a compendium of rati onality and technical effi ciency -an autonomous body, full of benefi cent power desti ned to rati onalize the life and acti vity of society: but it is really the concept of "rati onalizati on" which appears problemati c for him, and does not seem suffi ciently clarifi ed. Using Mannheim's famous disti ncti on, 21 we can say that Weber left obscure the diff erenti ati on between a functi onal type of rati onalizati on as technical efi fi ciency, and "substanti al" rati onalizati on. He was certainly aware of, and could demonstrate, the diff erences between some forms of ancient bureaucracies and the modern organizati on of industry and public administrati on, but it is also the case that to use the measure of effi ciency and producti vity so plainly could more than once be of litt le assistance in evaluati ng and prompti ng rati onalizati on. One may argue that Weber ends up by counterposing to the undervaluati on of the bureaucrati c phenomenon by historical materialism a symmetrical positi on: however, one of the opposite kind, 19 The principle of the separati on of the labourer from the material means of exercise of authority is wholly accepted by Weber, and use of this principle allows for a broader and deeper analyti cal extension applicable to a wider number of phenomena. It is common to the modern state exercise of power, and its civilizati on in a politi cal and military sense, and to private, capitalist industry. In both cases, the disposability of these means is in the hands of the power to which the design of the bureaucracy conforms. This design is characteristi c of all these organizati ons, and its existence and functi on is indissolubly linked, both as cause and eff ect, with the concentrati on of the material means of its exercise. Again, the hierarchical dependence of the worker, the shop assistant, the technician, the government or military functi onary rests on a totally technical foundati on. For the instruments, supplies, and the fi nancial means indispensable for the maintenance and independence of the economy are concentrated for deployment on the one hand by the entrepreneur, and on the other by the politi cal leader or government. Cf. 
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employing a kind of rati onalisti c overesti mati on of the phenomenon. In modern society the growing process of bureaucrati zati on takes place simultaneously with the process of socializati on. This process -for Weber -is irreversible, and he sees it as highly improbable that there can be any working out of means suitable for containing it. Nonetheless, for Weber, this is what should be att empted, in order to conserve part of "free humanity" and bring individuals to an awareness of their rights. This could provide hope for a new; diff erent "meaning" to give to the unstoppable "bureaucrati c travail" and lessen for man the dangers of hypostases in terms simply of calculati on, effi ciency, and producti vity.
Possibly only in some remarks by Nietzsche, whose work Weber was familiar with, are there criti cal demands as passionate as they are tormented concerning the bureaucrati c travail," like those the theorist of bureaucrati c power was setti ng forth aft er the Protestant ethic. Weber said that the puritan wanted to be a professional, while we have to be. Just as ecstasy was taken from monasti c cells to professional life and began to dominate lay existence, it helped to build the powerful economic order -linked to technical and economic presuppositi ons about mechanical producti on -which now determines extraordinary strictly the style of life of each individual. Perhaps it will conti nue to do this unti l the last ton of coal is burnt: to determine the lifestyle of everyone born in this system, not those taking part in purely economic acti vity. Concern for material possessions should -for the "chosen" -be wrapped around like a light cloak, easily thrown off , in Baxter's view. However, desti ny made that cloak a steel cage.
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This concern returns pressingly and sti ll more dramati cally as a persistent Leitmoti v in Weber's Politi cal writi ngs. Weber, as regards the form of method, rejects any "substanti al" (substanti elle) noti on of collecti ve groupings, in order to start from, and preserve -in his analysis -the individual (Einzelindividuum). Here, too, regarding the aimless perfecti on which in his view seems an essenti al characteristi c of bureaucrati cformal orders, typical of technically advanced societi es on the way to being totally administered (to use Horkheimer's formulati on), Weber's analysis easily overcomes the limits of a simply psychosocial phenomenology so as to broaden out more oft en into "structural explanati ons." That is, to expand into propositi on at the basis of which it is a social formati on, not an individual, which determines certain consequences for itself and other social formati ons. In the 1909 meeti ng of the Verein fur Sozialpoliti k, Weber noted that if we look at a purely technical, effi cient administrati on as the peak and sole ideal, one may certainly say -to hell with anything else. Think of the eff ect of this total 22 Weber, Sociologia delle religioni, 1: 321.
F. FERRAROTTI -BISMARCK'S ORPHAN: THE MODERN WORLD AND ITS DESTINY, FROM "DISENCHANTMENT" TO THE "STEEL CAGE" 27 bureaucrati zati on and rati onalizati on which we now see approaching. Every worker is measured in this calculati on like a cog of the machine, and increasingly from within he is thus compelled to feel like this, to ask himself only if perhaps from being a small wheel he might one day become a big wheel. It is as though in politi cs the craze for order -in the perspecti ve wherein those Germans who thought they were acti ng for the best will end up -was enough to decide everything. It is as though only through knowledge and will we must become men who serve "order" and nothing but order, and who become nervous and scared as soon as this order wavers for a second, and become helpless as soon as they are uprooted from this total incorporati on into order. Let us hope the world does not know that these "sons of order" are the evoluti onary development to which we are constantly dispatched.
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Weber perceives, therefore, and plumbs the depths of a purely instrumental rati onality, but he does not have the technical nor the methodological means to solve it. He would rather historically analyze it, with great coldness and the academic modesty characteristi c of him. His project of off ering us the global vision of everything involved -as simultaneously cause and eff ect -in the makeup of the social is unquesti onably fascinati ng. However, his limits are equally undeniable. They are plain in the very ti tle of his major work: not "economy" as against, under, before, or aft er "society," but "economy and society." That is, we have the economic framework together with the cluster of varied, multi dimensional, contradictory social facts in equilibrium; at the same level, with a tendency to stand fast, if not freeze -despite their anti nomies -they remain in unstable equilibrium. Only the will, the projects of individuals by chance ("charismati cally") possessed by "Catalinarian rage" of the demon of acti on, will be able to set these things in moti on -unpredictably, or by means of an inscrutable "desti ny."
It may seem paradoxical that the theorist of the modem world as a totally calculable world should arrive at such a conclusion. However, this is also the proof of his rigorous intellectual honesty which led him to reject the illusory promises of "sacrifi ed" history and the recipes of ideological speculati ons passed off as intersubjecti vely binding scienti fi c certainti es. This is the atti tude of a sociologist who rejects consolatory shortcuts, by being sati sfi ed with the role of the imparti al and unbending witness to the crisis. Among the many duti es of sociology he never accepted, sti ll less counseled, consolati on at all costs.
Mar Webers Limitations
The richness and depth of Weber's analysis are beyond questi on. However, there is sti ll a questi on regarding what was menti oned in the third part of this arti cle: Weber,
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as a committ ed intellectual, from the podium of his university chair and from that of politi cal journalism, did not foresee the rise of Nazism. With the introducti on of Arti cle 48 into the Weimar consti tuti on one may even argue that unconsciously he assisted it.
How is this? How could this famous scholar, troubled by scruples concerning the accuracy of documents involving ancient Eastern religions to the point of losing sleep over them, then so grossly fail down when there was a questi on of the immediate politi cal future of his country? How could this champion of autonomous research have been so shortsighted when faced with the impending ruin of the Weimar Republic, which portended the coming to power of Nazism? What is the hidden reason for this complete blindness, which seems to damage quite unexpectedly his extraordinary analyti cal acuteness? The surprising element is sti ll more evident if we think about the disturbing fact that, as regards the details of the European politi cal and cultural situati on, Weber gave ample proof of excepti onal perspicacity. He foresaw the fragmentati on and politi cal segmentati on which would result from adopti ng the electoral law of proporti onal representati on. He has no illusions, and indeed describes extremely accurately the emergence of, and the sociopsychological type of, the professional politi cian, who no longer lives for politi cs but off it. He is more analyti cal than Marx, but also than Werner Sombart as regards industrial complexes and bureaucrati c hyperdevelopment. He never ti red of presenti ng typologies of the city, endless catalogues of acti viti es and social types, defi niti ons, disti ncti ons, and subdisti ncti ons of strata, conditi ons, and power. All this is destroyed by the simple sociopoliti cal, economic, and cultural reality of post-Wilhelmine Germany. While the great sociologist set out his typologies with cultured intelligence, a former house painter and frustrated arti st was writi ng Mein Kampf, and expressing in it the fear and anguish of a defeat which was never accepted and recognized as such -the desire of a whole people which felt it had been cheated of victory and thirsted for a new conquest but did not realize it.
To understand both the merits and limits of the method and substance of Weberian sociology this questi on is basic. However, this questi on is never clearly raised. Rather, even the most incisive commentators tend to draw from Weber's deep well all the materials which, by chance, they happen to need, without thinking of the constructi on of the whole -with the same merry thoughtlessness with which the medieval churchbuilders ravaged the temples of classical anti quity. Teachers are usually destroyed by their disciples, and Weber did not escape this rule. We have already pointed to Parsons' approach, which basically sees in Weber no more than his own forerunner. For Parsons, Weber began the constructi on of the general theory of the "social system" and intenti onally directed acti on. Too bad, Parsons seems to say, that he stopped half-way. There is no surprise, therefore, that it is up to Parsons to take up and complete the task. Naturally, this is a total misunderstanding. Parsons is facing problems which do not even marginally enter into the problemati c context of Weber's interests. Weber is faced with a problem of change or at least the reorientati on of an elite -an economic summit -social and politi cal, summoned by the increasing power of a Germany reunited by Bismarck to measure up to its real historic stature: its own suitability as regards the needs of rati onal directi on and opti mal use of human and material resources -clearly on the increase -so as to break defi niti vely the traditi onal balances in Europe, established by the Congress of Vienna and already fl awed by the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Parsons has to discharge, more or less consciously, a quite diff erent functi on.
Even before 1940 -The Structure of Social Acti on dates from 1936 24 -and especially from the years immediately following the war, setti ng himself up as the interpreter of the re-emergence of a systemati c claim from the social sciences, Parsons quietly began a discussion which perfectly suited the deepest needs of American society. There is no doubt that in both his manner of thought and his life-style, Parsons belonged to the descendants of the great cultural systemati zers and the "lay popes." However, one should see these things from closer at hand. The America which was a victor in the Second World War was radically diff erent from the America of the prewar period. Whitman's verse was a long way off ; the crude simplicity of the pioneers, their domesti c virtues -a memory ti nged with rhetoric -the innocence of a whole new world, beyond the complicated entanglements of confl icti ng ideologies and the defi ling struggles of power politi cs, was lost forever.
Almost by surprise, America found itself aft er the Second World War in an essenti ally new positi on, now distant from any concrete possibility of isolati onism and irremediably involved in world aff airs. It was an uncomfortable positi on, to which middle Americans and the ruling classes themselves were unaccustomed, but it was inevitable. Once Wilson's moralism and rigid Puritanism had spent itself in the immediate postwar period, the United States had been able to return to its normal framework, having obviously made good bargains. Having entered the war in 1917 when the die was already cast, with few casualti es and, all in all, litt le bother, they managed to go from being a debtor nati on (especially as regards France and England) to a creditor nati on, among moribund and starving allies. Once the armisti ce was signed, American soldiers, strategists, and statesmen had been able to abandon Europe and return peacefully to their own domesti c customs, leaving behind almost a litt le elite of writers in Paris and thereabouts who were to have a ball at least unti l the great crash of 1929, when the collapse of industrial shares on Wall Street and the adverse exchange rate of the dollar were, somewhat brusquely, to close the splendid Parisian interlude of Gertrude Stein, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, and the others. In this context, despite its 30 ACADEMICUS -INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL meannesses -especially as regards Fitzgerald -we should remember Hemingway's A Movable Feast, required reading on this phenomenon.
The period aft er the Second World War was radically diff erent. The United States came out in a hegemonic positi on on the world scale and could no longer simply go home. In this profoundly altered situati on, one can grasp the deep purpose and the reason -not by chance -for Parsons' desti ny. His work became emblemati c. The constructi on of the "social system" and the identi fi cati on of its functi onal prerequisites might appear as a purely theoreti cal undertaking in intellectual terms. In reality, it was the reply to a complex politi cal need which postwar America felt in its most sensiti ve nerveendings, in the tormenti ng sense of a new, unspoken imperial responsibility which England's decline placed on its back: this made her insecure. It provided a sti ll emoted sensati on, though already perceived as an inevitable result, or a kind of murky penalty, that the country would not be able to go home and barricade itself within, forgetti ng the Old World and its complicated intrigues and irresolvable problems. America was forced to face up to the external world -the "un-American" world. This was no choice but a questi on of survival. Beyond ideological confrontati on and questi ons of the empire, there were only irrelevance and historical destructi on. America had to acknowledge herself, sett le on her own identi ty so as to present herself as a credible point of reference and an ideal assembly or meeti ng point for the ideological loyalty of human beings.
Parsons' "social system" is the visiti ng card of the United States. That is, it is the toughest, most mature att empt the country makes to recognize and identi fy itself -the att empt, so to speak, to "refl ect itself' in a systemati c construct at a high level of abstracti on, in which the basic principles of their common life, analyti cally justi fi ed and guaranteed against any possible development, are laid down and established forever. This is done as a reply, an exorcism of the danger of falling apart before making contact with the "outside world," "other" cultures.
This complex politi cal need for self-analysis and self -affi rmati on of postwar America is double: it has an internal and external dimension. On the internal level, this need shows the necessity for homogenizati on, integrati on, that it becomes an eff ecti ve "union," not simply as a juridical enti ty (our more perfect Union -as a society of immigrants, blacks and whites, people of radically diff erent racial and religious origins, and with profoundly confl icti ng interests, beneath the offi cial credo of equality). On the level of internati onal and intercultural relati ons, a postwar America has not only to resolve the problem of the photogenic projecti on of its own image. For this, the tale of the returning immigrants, those who in some way made their fortune in "God's own country," would perhaps suffi ce. Rather, there is a questi on of presenti ng America as a determinate historical reality, while simultaneously making it tend toward, or coincide with, the absolute, atemporal model of an industrially advanced, technically progressive society. This would be done so that it might join onto and identi fy itself with, ulti mately, the only civil society believ able these days, empirically identi fi able and at the same ti me normati ve in ideal terms for all possible societi es. The confusion, typically American, between datum and value becomes clear in this perspecti ve: the confusion, that is, between what is and what ought to be. In additi on the -typically American -inability to see one as the other, to accept the otherness of the other, also becomes clear: that is, one sees the imperialisti c, "missionary" tendency to want to reduce the other to oneself, to project oneself, one's values and culture, onto what is other than oneself. They are projected onto other cultures, other diff erent values, so denying -along with the pluralism of cultures and values -the dialecti c and history. So it externalizes itself, with the level of development historically determined and att ained, as though it were the absolute level, the terminus of history, the end of the evoluti onary potenti al of humanity and of the economic, politi cal, and cultural stage of its common life. At the same ti me, it refuses in the specifi c historical and politi cal reality to understand others and to have relati ons with other peoples and cultures which are other than those direct or indirect dominati on.
Behind Parsons' systemati c expositi on, there thus emerges the double politi cal need of the United States to integrate and cohere within, and at the same ti me to assert itself hegemonically at the level of internati onal relati ons. The task Weber assigns himself is quite diff erent. The rati onalism he sees as the disti ncti ve mark of the West, and which he sees as triumphing in the major bureaucrati c organs and the rise of the modern state, should not be confused with the "instrumental acti vism" of which Parsons speaks. While for Weber the concern and basic preoccupati on lies in the raising of a responsible politi cal elite, independent of the major bureaucrats who lack responsibility in the full sense of the word, for Parsons politi cal tension has already collapsed and been diminished to the extent that politi cal directi on and administrati ve practi ce can be passed off as the same thing.
Weber and the Dialectic
It is thus clear that it is impossible to see Weber as the premise for Parsons' systemati c framework. The inadmissability of this concepti on rests on two basic orders of reasoning. The fi rst concerns the specifi c historical context to which two writers belong and their responses to the diff erent requirements they seek. We have already menti oned these reasonings. The second, on the other hand, lies in the intrinsic logical moti ves on which, however schemati cally, we ought to dwell. In this light, we should fi rst point out that Weber, in clear contradicti on with Parsons' purpose, nowhere shows any interest in building a "system." The sense of historical specifi city is very much alive in him. Weber prefers to concentrate on the real changes in Western history rather than set about constructi ng a general theory of development or social
